Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate.
Introduction
Nonpoint source pollution of air and water is an important and particularly vexing economic problem. When accurate monitoring is prohibitively expensive, the corrective regulation will inevitably involve errors in assessing contributions to damage. A large literature, much of which is surveyed in Shortle and Horan [13] , has emerged with intent to identify optimal policies. Some studies, as in Xepapadeas [14] , and Millock, Sunding, and Zilberman [11] , consider the act of monitoring as a policy choice variable. Most of them, such as the ambient taxes modeled in Segerson [12] and Cabe and Herriges [3] , use proxies for damage when assessing an imperfect Pigouvian tax. However, as far as we can ascertain, no studies have been done on how taxation in the presence of noisy signals concerning damage might affect incentives to abate. That is the matter of our article.
We pose a Bayesian model in which external damage can take two levels and polluters can be of two types with regard to pollution activities. The types differ in the probability of causing low damage. Otherwise, types differ by production costs. A regulator can monitor a firm to better discern the firm's type, and then use this information to guide firm activities (produce or not).
The costs of monitoring are not relevant to the argument we make, and we ignore them. The signal received, though unbiased and not manipulable by the firm, is imperfect or noisy. In the absence of any opportunity to abate on the part of the firm, we show it is optimal for the regulator to use the signal to assess a tax equal to the firm's expected damage conditional upon the signal.
In this way, losses from what we call the wrong-firm problem (WFP) are minimized. The WFP is the sum of two concerns: that a noisy Pigouvian tax induces i) a firm that would on average generate positive social surplus under production to not produce, and ii) a firm that would on average generate negative social surplus under production to produce.
We then introduce an abatement opportunity, the cost of which varies across firms. In this setting, specifying the tax equal to expected damage may not be optimal. This is because the averaging involved in forming an expectation on damage reduces the incentive to incur the abatement cost. A further issue is that in the Bayesian game there may be a unique equilibrium set of abaters, or multiple equilibrium sets of abaters. In all cases, however, too little abatement will occur. The adverse consequences for abatement are shown to be most severe when the WFP is a significant problem, i.e., when one might otherwise have benefited most from setting taxes equal to expected damage. This presents a policy dilemma in that, without further information, production distortions may have to be traded off against abatement distortions. We discuss the judicious use of policy instrument combinations.
Model framework
The model we develop concerns regulation over a set of firms sufficiently small that production consequences do not affect output market prices. A consumption good has market value B and can be produced by a continuum of firms with each supplying one unit of output. A is likely to be nontrivial. Pigouvian taxation may improve performance, but the extent of success will depend upon the statistical attributes of parameters c and θ , and in particular on how well a tax matches the damage done. Fig. 1 provides a benchmark for our analysis. It is, however, only a limiting case for the problem we will address. In Fig. 1 it is assumed that all information on damage is available to the regulator. More generally, we will study the case where a regulator receives a signal and uses it to design signal-conditioned optimal taxes.
Pigouvian taxation
The model in this section does not address the abatement issue. It only asks how a regulator should tax in the presence of noisy signals on damage when the single decision a firm can make is whether to produce. Since a firm's value of θ is not always available to the regulator, it is more realistic to condition the tax on some other attribute. Let the timeline be that 0) nature draws c and type for a firm, 1) then the regulator receives a signal about a firm's production environment and levies a tax on the unit in order to optimally deter damage, and 2) then the producer makes the production decision. The signal received at time 1 is random; it is not manipulated in any way by the sender. Fig. 2 provides a timeline.
Our focus is on economic losses due to policy issues. In order to be concrete about how policy problems can arise and can be mitigated, we place more structure on the firm set and on ) and an H signal with probability 1 α − (respectively, 1 α δ − − ). The way to view α is as a lottery for the regulator whereby the true damage will turn out to be L θ with probability α and H θ with probability 1 α − . The signal emitted by a firm is unbiased in that if the firm is an α then L is emitted with probability α and damage is L θ with probability α . But the signal realization is independent of the damage realization. Note that even if the regulator were to observe the firm type, she would still be exposed to this lottery risk. When we assert that a firm should produce we mean that the firm provides a lottery that makes the firm, in expectation, a (positive) surplus generator.
Type-conditioned expected damage levels are
;
on each of the respective types. These would be appealing tax assessments were firm type known. But firm type is not known, and the only information available to the regulator is signal
The share of firms that are α δ + is, for this section, exogenous at (0,1) φ ∈
. Later we will endogenize φ when we introduce an abatement choice and identify incentives problems concerning abatement investments. In this section the intent is to show that there are efficiency problems that have nothing to do with abatement inefficiencies.
When the regulator receives a signal , { , } i i L H ∈ , then she uses Bayes' theorem to assess 
The following is shown in the appendix. (4) and (6)
SCED taxes are squeezed between the taxes that would apply were firm type known to the regulator. This observation will be central when we study abatement incentives.
To this point we have assumed that the lotteries represented by firms of types α and α δ + are fixed. These lotteries represent the informativeness of the signals given. We will show next that the level of dispersion in signals determines the level of dispersion in optimal taxes. 5 This is relevant because, as we will show later, dispersion in taxes encourages abatement.
Let a different conditioner be used so that the signal structure changes, X X′ → . The 
where | |
(1 ) ;
Similarly, under ex post taxation and using
From equations (9)- (11), the following results can be easily obtained.
Proposition 2. Under SCED taxation, all of H t , L t − , and H L t t − are increasing and convex in η .
A more informative signaling system, as defined by an increase in η , will render the SCED taxes more dispersed. We will defer comments on Proposition 2 until we study abatement problems that SCED taxes may generate. Our next goal is to characterize the losses that SCED taxes are optimal in guarding against.
Losses from the WFP
Under the SCED taxes given in (6), we will develop a loss function capturing statistical type I and II errors, namely, the losses when a tax induces firms that I) should produce (under the lottery in damages the firm provides) to shut down, and II) should shut down to produce.
Consider I) first. This can occur when the tax is too high, i.e., when the firm is type α δ + and either the signal is i) H or ii) L. 6 For i), the expected benefit from production would be 
(1 
Summing, total expected loss from misdirected firms is 7 .
The loss function is described in Fig. 3 , with B c − on the horizontal axis and conditional loss on the vertical axis. Intervals Ia and Ib are where type I errors occur; see (12) . In the loss function, two weightings are applied. One is a cost weighting as represented through the integration in (12) and the downward-sloping line segment in Fig. 3 . The other is a weighting by the overall probability that wrong signals of this sort occur, and this second weighting differs across the intervals Ia and Ib. Interval IV represents firms that do not produce and should not produce under both signals, so there are no losses for such firms. Intervals IIa and IIb are where type II errors occur, and the structure in (13) is similar to that for type I error. On the right is interval III, representing firms such that production should and does occur (given limited information as represented by the lotteries) under either signal so there could be no loss. 8 The possibility of type I and II errors does not disappear when the signal is completely informative because it informs only on firm type and the types continue to emit heterogeneous signals.
Abatement, absent the WFP
From this point on we extend the H-L damage model by assuming a firm can alter the extent of damage done through an abatement activity. That is, the firm becomes type α or type α δ + by making an abatement choice. The timeline is now that 0) nature draws the production cost c and the abatement cost, call it e , for a firm, 1) then the firm makes a non-observable investment decision on abatement that determines firm type, 2) then the regulator receives a signal , i i ∈ { , } L H , about a firm's production environment and levies a SCED tax on the unit, and 3) then the producer makes the production decision. Fig. 4 provides the timeline. In this section, however, we assume that firms always operate (i.e., B c − is sufficiently high) since our intent is to understand how SCED taxation in the presence of noisy signals on damage can affect incentives even absent the WFP. We will later show that the problem we identify here and the WFP have similar effects on incentives.
Signals emitted by firms are affected by the abatement action. Under no action, the regulator observing (ex post) the producer's operation will receive an L signal with probability (0,1)
and an H signal otherwise. Under the action, denoted as letter a , the regulator observing the producer's operation will receive an L signal with probability α δ + , and an H signal otherwise.
The cost of the action, e , is heterogeneous across firms, having strictly increasing distribution
. This distribution is known to the regulator, but no more is known to the regulator apart from the observed signal. So a firm is now characterized by the couple ( , ) c e , and the firm's lottery characterization of α or α δ + is an endogenous choice. For convenience we will assume that e and c are independent.
The regulator's assessed SCED tax upon receiving a signal { , } i L H ∈ is i t . The sum of expected tax and action cost to the firm upon not taking the action is set at 
To identify the problem with SCED taxation, assume that taxes are as in (6) , except that endogenous ( ) J e substitutes for exogenous φ . Thus, taxes are 
Notice that L t is decreasing in e because the probability the action is taken given L is increasing in the fraction taking the action. Similarly, H t is decreasing in e . This means that the taxes are (weakly at any rate) too high. Noting that ê e ≤ , means damage is given as 
and is socially excessive. In summary,
Proposition 3. Let the tax imposed on a firm be the SCED. Assume that e and c are independently distributed and the support of c is such that no firm will shut down upon emitting signal H. Then, relative to perfect signals on firm type, noisy signals lead to underinvestment in abatement and an increase in mean damage.
The central point of this paper is the contrast between Proposition 1 (where abatement opportunities were not available) and Proposition 3. When in the presence of abatement opportunities, setting taxes equal to SCED will distort incentives. From (15) and (17) 
Since H L t t − is not monotone in e we cannot be sure from (19) whether there is a unique fixedpoint solution. Before going further, let us consider what the condition relates. Nature moves first in describing the distribution of firm characteristics. The regulator's rule of setting taxes equal to SCED is known to firms. Firms make production and abatement decisions that are consistent with that rule and in light of the noise externalities that firms impose on each other. The game is Bayesian where the regulator interprets signals to arrive at fixed-point problem (19), solves it for the set abating, and then sets tax values using (17). Thus, (19) and (17) represent a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a game of imperfect information as explained in Fudenberg and Tirole [6] . Three cases illustrate much of the content in (17) and (19). is ˆ0 e = . That is, the Nash equilibrium is for no one to abate when the optimal solution is for all to abate. Is it a stable solution? From (19) and 9 ˆ0 e = is one of three roots, but we have already cancelled through by it. 10 [10] showed that the inability to observe drug abuse directly, rather than only through accidents, elicited an insufficient wage incentive to cure drug dependency.
Hennessy [7] and Bogetoft and Olesen [2] showed that noisy grading of produce in the presence of competitive trading after production elicited insufficient incentive to invest in quality enhancement. In our case, the problem arises with SCED taxation and not with competitive
The roots are on either side of the unit interval. 11 The larger root is at most one if and only if (1 ) ( 1 3 trading. As such, the problem is one the regulator has much control over. Indeed, the problem originates from a regulatory attempt to increase social welfare. 
where independence between c and e ensures that the i t are as in Proposition 1. 
This inequality, together with the logic underpinning Proposition 3, leads immediately to 
Naïve taxation and other policy issues
We have seen that levying Pigouvian taxes at the SCED levels reduces the incentive to abate and, furthermore, the extent of reduction is stronger when the WFP is relevant. If the WFP never occurs, then optimal taxes are easy to identify. Just compare (15) 12 Bogetoft and Olesen [2] make a related point when motivating the use of competition through contracts rather than competition through competitive trading after production in markets for It may, however, be that stretching the taxes delivers no additional abatement. This would occur were ( ) ( ) 0 J e J e − = , i.e., were no firms deterred from abating in any case. Suppose that equilibrium e is completely inelastic to the shift from SCED taxation to naïve taxation so that we may write ( ) J e as φ , exogenous. Then the change in losses due to the WFP is ( ) Were it possible, and in addition to SCED taxation, providing a small direct subsidy on abatement to this amount would be optimal. Since abatement is not observable, the subsidy might be in the form of public involvement in technology awareness and/or skill development. Note that the subsidy in (26) depends on c so that, even within the Case ii) interval, the value of c would need to be known in order to implement the subsidy.
Case iii),
H L c B t B t ∈ − − : Equation (26) When costs span two or more of these cases, no single subsidy level will support first best.
Finally, a further approach would be to tackle the problem directly by subsidizing research and development of a more informative test. Proposition 2, when viewed together with (15)-(16),
shows that the level of abatement that occurs under imposition of SCED taxes is increasing and convex in η , implying increasing marginal benefits from an innovation that increases the value of test informativeness.
Conclusion
The intent of this paper has been to tease out consequences of Pigouvian taxation in the presence of noisy signals. For policy guidance, we are of the view that a bundle of policies may prove most practical in remedying losses from distorted production and abatement levels. This c c , (A5) resolves to the tax levels as given in (6) . Convexity at the solution to (A5) is immediate upon applying (A5) to second derivatives of (A5).
